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International Aspects of Corporate-Shareholder Tax
Integration
by George N. Carlson*
Mr. Carlson examines the various methods of integration of
corporate and shareholder taxes. The article emphasizes the in-
ternational consequences of integration by comparing the
imputation method of shareholder taxation, employed by many
counties, with the separate-entity theory which is the basis of
the United States tax system. The author notes the concern of
the United States in maintaining capital export neutrality, non-
discrimination in taxation, and equitable division of revenue
between source and residence jurisdictions. He offers a pro-
posal which suggests that these goals may be accomplished
while integrating the United States corporate-shareholder tax
system in order to promote capital formation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The integration of corporate and shareholder taxes has received
considerable attention in recent years. Several major trading partners
of the United States, including Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and
the United Kingdom, have integrated their tax structures by giving in-
dividual shareholders a credit for taxes paid at the corporate level on
distributed corporate earnings. In response to a perceived inadequacy
of capital formation, integration has also aroused the interest of policy
makers in the United States.
The Ford Administration, for example, proposed dividend integra-
tion as part of its 1975 tax reform recommendations.' In 1976 the
Task Force on Capital Formation of the House Committee on Ways
and Means examined integration as part of its study of investment
needs and incentives.2 In response to one of President Carter's cam-
* B.A. (1964) University of Washington; M.A. (1966) Cornell University; Ph.D.
(1971) (University of Illinois. Office of International Tax Affairs, United States
Treasury Department. The opinions expressed are those of the author and not
necessarily the views of the Treasury Department.
I Tax Reform Proposals: Public Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and
Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3843 (1976) (statement of William E. Simon, Secretary of
the Treasury).
2 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TAX POLICY AND
CAPITAL FORMATION 9 (Comm. Print 1977).
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paign pledges, the Treasury Department looked closely at several
methods for integrating corporate and individual income taxes while
developing the Administration's 1978 tax reform proposals. Because of
the complexity of the issues and the need for an immediate economic
stimulus, the Administration ultimately decided not to propose an in-
tegration plan. 3 Most recently, Chairman Ullman of the Committee on
Ways and Means proposed a partial integration plan as an "important
start toward making corporate finance more efficient and more respon-
sive to the country's need for increased capital formation. " 4 The Con-
gress, however, in passing the Revenue Act of 1978, opted for lower
corporate rates and a more generous investment tax credit as the vehi-
cle for reduced taxation of capital.
While there are a variety of methods available,' most of the coun-
tries which have integrated their tax systems allow individual
shareholders a credit for taxes paid at the corporate level on
distributed earnings. In effect, some of the taxes paid by the corpora-
tion are "imputed to," or treated as paid by, the shareholder.
This form of integration, coupled with the flow of capital across
international borders, gives rise to two important international taxa-
tion issues:
(1) Whether nonresident shareholders are entitled to the credit for
corporate taxes.
(2) Whether a resident taxpayer is entitled to the credit for foreign
corporate taxes paid.
The first issue concerns whether the country adopting the in-
tegrated system would extend the credit to nonresident shareholders in
domestic corporations. The second issue concerns whether a foreign
corporate tax would be creditable against the domestic income tax in
the shareholder's country of residence.
This article analyzes these issues with respect to three of the basic
principles of United States international tax policy: capital export
neutrality, nondiscrimination in the taxation of residents and
3 See Statement of Donald C. Lubick, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Policy, Integration of the Corporate and Inditdual Income Tax, Before the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, April 7, 1978,
Treasury Department News Release, B-818.
4 124 CONG. REC. H640 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1978).
See Ault, International Issues in Corporate Tax Integration, 10 LAW & POL'Y
IN INT'L Bus. 461 (1978); J. CHOWN, THE REFORM OF CORPORATION TAX (London:
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Publication No. 2, 1971); C. McLure, International
Aspects of Integration, ch. VI (unpublished Brookings Institute Manuscript).
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nonresidents, and an equitable division of tax revenues between the
source and residence jurisdictions. The paper begins with a review of
the taxation of corporations and shareholders under separate entity
and integrated tax systems.
II. PRESENT LAW
A. Separate Entity System
With limited exceptions, the United States has a classical or
separate entity system of taxation. 6 A corporation is taxed on its earn-
ings (as a separate entity) and its shareholders are taxed on distributed
earnings. Double taxation is reduced at the corporate level by allowing
a United States corporation to deduct eighty-five percent or 100 per-
cent, depending on the degree of affiliation, of dividends received
from other United States corporations.' Generally speaking, individual
shareholders are fully taxable on distributed earnings.8
The present United States corporate tax rates are seventeen percent
on the first $25,000 of taxable income, twenty percent on all income in
excess of $25,000 up to $50,000, thirty percent on all income in excess
of $50,000 up to $75,000, forty percent on all income in excess of
$75,000 up to $100,000 and forty-six percent on all income in excess of
$100,000.1 Resident individuals are subject to tax on dividends at rates
ranging from fourteen to seventy percent.' 0 Nonresident alien in-
dividuals and foreign corporations are subject to a statutory
withholding tax of thirty percent on dividend income not effectively
connected with a United States trade or business."
The separate entity principle extends to United States shareholders
in a foreign corporation. All United States citizens, residents, and cor-
porations are subject to United States taxation on their worldwide
' Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code is a notable exception. It permits
a corporation with 15 or fewer shareholders to elect not to pay corporate tax on its in-
come and instead have the shareholders pay taxes on the income, whether distributed
or not.
I.R.C. § 243.
A shareholder is allowed to exclude $100 of dividends from taxable domestic
corporations from his taxable income. I.R.C. § 116. Prior to 1964, the law provided
for an exclusion from income of first $50 of dividends received from domestic corpora-
tions as well as a four percent credit against tax of dividends in excess of $50.
9 I.R.C. § 11.
10 I.R.C. § 1.
" I.R.C. §§ 871 and 881. An income tax treaty between the United States and
another country usually provides a reduced, to fifteen percent or less, withholding rate
on dividends.
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income. Generally, however, United States shareholders in a foreign
corporation are taxable only on income received as dividends, not on
income retained by the foreign corporation. Due to the fact that no
United States tax is imposed until the earnings of a foreign corporation
are distributed to the United States shareholders, the separate entity
system confers a deferral upon the shareholders.
B. Integration Systems
There are a variety of methods for integrating corporate and in-
dividual income taxes. Under full integration, which no country has
adopted, all of a corporation's income, whether distributed or not,
would be taxable only to the shareholders. The corporation thus would
be taxable as a partnership. To minimize liquidity problems at the
shareholder level, the corporate tax would probably be kept as a with-
holding device to be creditable against the shareholders' individual tax
liability. 12
The countries which have integrated their tax structures have done
so only with respect to distributed earnings. This is known as partial
integration and can be accomplished by either (1) the split-rate or divi-
dend deduction method or (2) an imputation or shareholder credit
system. The former provides relief at the corporate level by taxing
dividends at either a reduced or zero rate. Prior to 1976, the German
split-rate system provided for a fifty-one percent tax on retained earn-
ings and a fifteen percent tax on distributed earnings.
The imputation or shareholder credit method of integration has
been adopted by Canada, France, and the United Kingdom. In con-
trast to the split-rate system, tax relief is provided at the shareholder
level by allowing the shareholder a credit for part (partial imputation)
or all (full imputation) of the corporate taxes paid on distributed earn-
ings. Some countries, such as Germany and Japan, have adopted a
"hybrid" system with both a split-rate and shareholder credit.1 s
IZ This was one of the recommendations of the Canadian Royal Commission on
Taxation, also known as the Carter Commission. See Canada Royal Commission on
Taxation, 4 Report of the Commission on Taxation 3 (1966); Bucovetsky and Bird,
Tax Reform in Canada: A Progress Report, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 15 (1972).
" For a detailed description of foreign integration systems see H. AULT & A.
RADLER, THE GERMAN CORPORATION TAX REFORM LAW (1976); CHOWN, supra note
5; Harry G. Gourevitch, Integration of Corporate and Shareholder Taxes on Income:
The European Experience, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May
1977; NTA-TIA Symposium, The Taxation of Income from Corporate Shareholding,
28 NAT'L TAX J. 255 (1975); and M. Sato & R. Bird, International Aspects of the
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The dividend deduction and imputation systems are illustrated in
examples 1 and 2.
Example I
Dividend Deduction System
Corporation Individual Shareholder
Tax Rate
Income $100 20% : 60%
Dividend 40 Cash dividend $40 $40
Dividend deduction (50%) 20. Tax 8 24
Taxable income $80 After-tax cash flow 32 16
Tax (50%) 40 Total:
After-tax income 60 Corporate plus shareholder,
Retained earnings $20 tax 48 64
Dividend 40
In example 1, the corporation is allowed to deduct fifty percent of
dividends paid. Assuming a tax rate of fifty percent, it has a tax
liability of $40 and retained earnings of $20 after paying a dividend of
$40. The shareholder's after-tax cash flow is $32 and $16, assuming in-
dividual income tax rates of. twenty percent and sixty percent, respec-
tively.
Example 2
Shareholder Imputation System
Corporation Individual Shareholder
Tax Rate
Income $100 20% : 60%
Corporate tax 50 Cash dividend $30 $30
After-tax income $50 Gross up (;J) 10 10
Retained earnings $20 Gross dividend $40 $40
Dividend 30 Tax 8 24
Tax credit 10 10
After-tax cash flow 32 16
Total:
Corporate plus
shareholder tax 48 64
Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders, International Monetary Fund Staff
Papers, 389 (May 1974).
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This system allows the shareholder a credit, equal to one-third of
the dividend, for taxes paid at the corporate level. The shareholder
"grosses up" or increases the $30 cash dividend by the $10 in corporate
tax claimed as a credit at the shareholder level. 1 4 The shareholder is
taxed on the "grossed up" dividend, but he is entitled to a credit of
$10 for part of the corporate taxes paid. The corporation's and the in-
dividual shareholder's cash flow are the same as in Example 1.
Thus, while the split-rate system nominally provides relief at the
corporate level and the imputation system at the shareholder level, the
two can be made equivalent. This requires, however, that the cash
dividend be reduced under an imputation system. The lower cash divi-
dend leaves the shareholder in the same after-tax position because he
receives a tax credit with the dividend. After-tax corporate profits
(dividends plus retained earnings) are higher, however, under the divi-
dend deduction system.
III. PRINCIPLES OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY
Under either a separate entity or integrated tax system, the move-
ment of capital across national boundaries gives rise to competing tax
claims. The two basic jurisdictional standards for asserting tax liability
are source and residence."5 Under the source standard, a country
asserts tax jurisdiction over income earned within its geographical
area. It makes no difference who receives the income; residents and
nonresidents are both taxed on income derived from within the source
jurisdiction. 16
The residence of the taxpayer, rather than the source of income, is
the relevant criterion under the residence principle. Residence is usually
defined in terms of domicile for individuals and place of incorporation
4 It may seem odd to require the shareholder to include corporate taxes in his
taxable income. This is necessary because the imputation system treats taxes paid at
the corporate level as paid by the shareholder, i.e., imputes them to the shareholder.
This part of the corporate tax can be thought of as a withholding tax, similar to wage
withholding, against the shareholder's individual tax liability. It is included in the
shareholder's income, just as is the withholding tax on wages.
"5 The United States also taxes on the basis of citizenship.
16 Residents and nonresidents are not necessarily taxed the same. Sections 871
and 881 of the Internal Revenue Code, for example, impose a flat-rate tax of thirty
percent on United States-source dividends, not effectively connected with a United
States trade or business, received by non-resident alien individuals and foreign cor-
porations. Although known as a withholding tax, the thirty percent tax does not repre-
sent a prepayment of domestic income tax, but a final tax payment that is a substitute
for being taxed at the regular rates applied to resident individuals and corporations.
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or management for corporations. Worldwide taxation is closely related
to the residence principle since a resident may be subject to taxation
on income from all sources, foreign and domestic alike.
Most countries have a combination of source and residence rules.
United States citizens and residents are subject to United States taxa-
tion on their worldwide income, while nonresident foreign taxpayers
are generally subject to United States taxation only on their United
States source income. 7 The same income will be taxed twice if it is
subject to taxation in both the source and residence jurisdictions. A
foreign subsidiary of a United States corporation, for example, normal-
ly will be subject to foreign tax on its earnings in the source jurisdic-
tion and the subsidiary's dividends will be subject to United States tax-
ation when received by the parent.
The need to resolve this double international taxation has given
rise to the following basic principles of United States international tax
policy: capital export neutrality, nondiscrimination between residents
and nonresidents, and a reasonable division of revenue between the
source and residence countries.
A. Capital Export Neutrality
This principle requires that an enterprise pay the same total taxa-
tion on its foreign as on its domestic profits. If, for example, a foreign
subsidiary of a United States corporation is taxed in the foreign coun-
try at forty percent, capital export neutrality would require a current
United States tax of six percent on those profits.' Capital export
neutrality tends to maximize world output or efficiency by permitting
investment decisions to be made independent of tax considerations on
the basis of the most favorable pre-tax rates of return.' 9 Capital is
1 Nonresident foreign taxpayers are subject to United States taxation at the nor-
mal rates on income "effectively connected" with a United States trade or business and
to the basic thirty percent withholding tax on United States source investment income,
such as dividends, interest, and royalties. The thirty percent rate frequently is reduced
by a tax treaty.
18 This assumes a United States corporate tax rate of forty-six percent. The effec-
tive United States rate on domestic profits is, however, less than this because of the in-
vestment tax credit and asset depreciation range, which are not available for foreign
investment. Equal investment incentives relate, of course, to effective, not nominal,
rates.
19 An alternative criterion is the maximization of national, rather than world, in-
come. This would be accomplished by allowing a deduction, rather than a credit, for
foreign taxes. Still ahother concept is capital import neutrality which is achieved when
both foreign and domestic firms pay the same ultimate tax in the country in which
1979]
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allocated optimally in that it is invested where, adjusted for risk, its
return is greatest.
The foreign tax credit is the cornerstone of the United States policy
of capital export neutrality.2 0 Foreign and domestic profits of a United
States corporation tend to be taxed the same because taxes paid to a
forein country can be subtracted from the taxpayer's United States
tax liability. The credit is available for income taxes paid on foreign
branch earnings, withholding taxes on dividends from a foreign cor-
poration,2 1 and the corporate tax on the underlying earnings out of
which the dividends are paid, provided the United States taxpayer is a
corporation which owns at least ten percent of the foreign
corporation.22
The credit is limited to the United States tax liability on the tax-
payer's foreign source income. 23 A taxpayer therefore pays the higher
of the United States or foreign rate. If, for example, the United States
rate is forty-eight percent and the foreign rate is forty-four percent,
the United States Treasury will collect four percent from the United
States taxpayer. If, however, the foreign rate is fifty-two percent, the
United States Treasury will neither collect revenue, nor refund the
four percent excess to the United States taxpayer.2 4 The purpose of the
limit is to prevent foreign taxes from reducing United States tax
revenue derived from domestic source income.
they are operating. For a discussion and evaluation of these concepts see G. C. Huf-
bauer, A. Guide to Law and Policy, U.S. Taxation of American Business Abroad,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (1975); PEGGY B. WYSGRAVE, JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, TAX PREFERENCES TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 92nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 176 (1972).
20 The policy is more properly characterized as modified capital export neutrality
in that foreign taxes are creditable only up to the United States level, and earnings of
a foreign subsidiary are not taxed until repatriated as dividends.
1, Unlike a withholding tax on the wages of a resident, a dividend withholding
tax is levied at a flat rate and is a final, rather than provisional tax payment.
Withholding taxes on dividends paid to nonresidents frequently are reduced to ten or
fifteen percent by treaty.
22 I.R.C. § 902.
2. I.R.C. § 904.
24 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the foreign tax credit limitation could
be determined on either a per-country or overall basis. The Act repealed the per-
country limitation and requires all taxpayers to use the overall method. This method
combines income from various sources, effectively enabling an averaging of high and
low foreign tax rates. If a taxpayer has foreign income that has been subject to a
relatively low tax, it is possible the entire fifty-two percent foreign tax in the above ex-
ample would be creditable against the United States tax liability.
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B. Nondiscrimination
This principle, which requires equal tax treatment for residents
and nonresidents, is another ,tenet of United States international tax
policy. In theory, a foreign branch or subsidiary of a United States
corporation should not be subject to heavier taxation in the foreign
country than a branch or subisidary of a domestic corporation is taxed
in that country. United States treaty policy is aimed at assuring that
United States investors are not subject to discriminatory tax treatment
by a foreign country. United States statutory policy aims at non-
discriminatory United States taxation of foreigners. While it is true
that dividends from a foreign subsidiary are usually subject to a
withholding tax in the foreign country, this is acknowledged to be an
acceptable alternative to the inability of the source country to subject
a nonresident's entire income to its individual income tax system.
Residents normally are taxed on their global income, while
nonresidents are taxed only on a source basis.
C. Tax Revenue Division
The United States also is interested in an equitable or reasonable
division of tax revenue between the source and residence countries.
The foreign tax credit cedes the first slice of tax revenue to the source
jurisdiction, leaving the residence jurisdiction with only residual taxing
rights. The United States feels this is reasonable in that it is ap-
propriate for the source jurisdiction to receive the major share of the
revenue.
IV. ANALYSIS
Most of the countries which have integrated their tax systems have
chosen the shareholder imputation, rather than the dividend deduction
system. This reflects, at least in part, a desire to explicitly exclude nonresi-
dent shareholders from the benefits of integration by not extend-
ing the imputation credit to them. These countries are aware that the
split-rate or dividend deduction system automatically extends the
benefits of integration to nonresident shareholders through the reduced
or zero rate applied to all dividend distributions. It would be possible
to effectively deny the benefits of integration by levying an increased
withholding tax on distributions to nonresidents, but existing treaties
with provisions for reciprocal withholding rates generally would pro-
hibit this.
19791
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A. Imputation Credit to Nonresidents: Portfolio Investment
Largely because of revenue considerations, imputation countries
are reluctant to extend the integration tax credit to nonresident
shareholders in domestic corporations. 2 Separate entity countries, like
the United States, argue that the principle of nondiscrimination
demands its extension. Table 1, below, which assumes a separate entity
system in the United States and a shareholder imputation or gross up
and credit system in the foreign country, provides a basis for
evaluating these claims with respect to an individual shareholder's
portfolio, or less than ten percent ownership investment.
Table 1
Cash Flow and Tax Liability Consequences for Resident and
Nonresident Portfolio Shareholders under Separate Entity and
Foreign Imputation Systems"
Nonresident
Shareholder in
Foreign Corporation
Shareholder's Income Resident Resident
and Tax Shareholder Shareholder Full
in United in Foreign Credit
States Corp- Corporation No Credit Extended
oration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. Cash Dividend
2. Gross up
3. Taxable Income
(1+2)
4. Tentative Tax
Liability2'
4(a). U.S.I .
4(b). Foreign4'
5. Shareholder Im-
putation Credit
(2=5)
6. Net Tax Liability
(4-5)
6(a). U.S.
6(b). Foreign
7. After-tax Cash
Flow (1-6)
$100 $100
50
100
33.33
33.33
33.33
33.33
66.67
$100 $100
- 50
-- 150
33.33
18.33
15
50
27.50
22.50
-- 50
33.33
18.33
15
0
27.50
(27.50)5*
66.67 100
11 The integration tax credit has been extended by treaty to nonresident
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This table was compiled by the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury,
Office of Tax Analysis, June 16, 1978.
The hypothetical foreign imputation system provides for a gross up and
credit equal to one-half the cash dividend. Assuming a corporate tax
rate of fifty percent, this would integrate one-half the corporate tax
with the individual income tax.
2* This assumes an individual tax rate of one-third in the shareholder's
country of residence.
3 This assumes a shareholder receives credit for foreign taxes against
United States tax liability.
4 This assumes a nonresident shareholder is subject to withholding tax of
fifteen percent on taxable income.
5* Withholding tax of $22.50 less credit of $50, for a refund of
$27.50.
Column 1 shows that a resident individual shareholder receiving a
$100 dividend from a United States corporation and subject to an in-
dividual tax rate of one-third would have an after-tax cash flow of
$66.67. A similarly situated resident individual in the imputation
country would receive $100 according to column 2. The integration of
the corporate and shareholder taxes in the foreign country accounts for
the difference.
Column 3 shows that a nonresident shareholder who does not
receive the imputation credit also would receive an after-tax payment
of $66.67. This would appear to fulfill the goal of capital export
neutrality. In addition, the revenue split (roughly $18 United States
and $15 foreign) would seem to be reasonable. Nonetheless, denying the
credit to a nonresident shareholder violates the principle of non-
discrimination. The nonresident shareholder is subject to heavier taxa-
tion in the foreign country than is the resident shareholder because he
receives a net dividend of only $85 ($100 cash less $15 withholding
tax), whereas the resident shareholder receives a net dividend of $100.
An important practical consequence is that the switch from a classical
to an integrated system will probably mean a reduced after-tax cash
flow for the foreign investor. Most corporations would probably reduce
their cash dividends in response to the imputation system. Resident
shareholders. Under the January 1, 1970 protocol to the United States-France income
tax treaty, France extends the same shareholder credit to United States individuals and
corporate portfolio investors in a French corporation that it provides for French in-
vestors. A United States corporation which owns ten percent or more of the shares of a
French corporation, and is thus a direct, rather than portfolio, investor, is excluded
from the scope of the protocol. See 1 TAx TREATIES (CCH) 2813.
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shareholders would still be likely to have an increased after-tax cash
flow because of their entitlement to a tax credit. The nonresident
shareholders, however, will be left with only the smaller cash dividend.
Extending the credit to the nonresident shareholder, as shown in
column 4, eliminates this discrimination. Both residents and
nonresidents are taxable on a cash dividend of $100 plus a $50
shareholder credit. 26 This may, however, be inconsistent with capital
export neutrality since the nonresident shareholder in a foreign cor-
poration now receives an after-tax payment of $100 while the resident
shareholder in a United States corporation receives only $66.67. One
might contend that foreign and domestic profits bear the same total
individual tax rate (one-third), but the total foreign dividend (cash
plus tax credit) is larger because of the reduction in corporate tax in-
herent in the imputation system. Still, for a given cash dividend
($100), the investor in the foreign corporation receives a larger after-
tax cash flow than the investor in a United States corporation.
The revenue division is altered greatly if the source country extends
the imputation credit to nonresidents since it will be giving up all of
the integrated portion of its corporate income tax with respect to
dividends paid to nonresidents. It is left with only the revenue from
the unintegrated portion of its corporate income tax. A country, such
as Germany, which has integrated its entire corporate tax on
distributed earnings (full imputation, but not full integration) would,
except for a withholding tax, collect no tax on dividends paid to
nonresidents. This result might be reasonable if one views the German
system, which gives a resident shareholder full credit against his in-
dividual tax liability for corporate taxes paid on dividend income, as
totally eliminating the corporate tax on distributed earnings.
B. Imputation Credit to Nonresidents: Direct Investment
The imputation countries are even more reluctant to extend the
shareholder credit to nonresident direct investors.2 7 In addition to the
26 It is true that the nonresident shareholder is taxed at only a fifteen percent
withholding rate on a grossed-up dividend of $150 while the resident shareholder is
taxed at an individual tax rate of thirty-three and a third percent. A withholding tax
on nonresidents, however, is the internationally-accepted alternative to the taxation of
resident individuals at the regular rates. It is not intended as a full or final tax since
only the country of residence can determine the appropriate tax burden by giving con-
sideration to the taxpayer's total income, deductions, and exemptions. The
withholding tax concept is not considered a departure from the non-discrimination
principle.
27 The United States-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, recently ratified by the
[Vol. 11:535
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obvious revenue considerations, they point out that the theory of an
imputation system is to provide relief for corporate taxes with respect
to distributions taxed at the individual level. Since a direct investor
with at least ten percent ownership normally will be a corporation,
they feel there is little reason for providing corporate tax relief for
distributions still in corporate solution. Moreover, because of the
operation of the indirect or deemed paid- foreign tax credit, 8 the
benefits of extending the credit to direct investors frequently will go to
the treasury of the residence country rather than to the shareholder.
From the viewpoint of separate entity countries, such as the United
States, it is discriminatory to deny the credit to nonresidents. The
argument put forth is that the imputation country has decided to
reduce its level of corporate taxation on distributed earnings. Whether
this is done through an imputation credit or a reduced rate on
distributed earnings is immaterial; to tax residents and nonresidents
differently violates the principle of nondiscrimination. Suppose, to il-
lustrate the point, that a corporation wholly owned by residents paid
no corporate tax, but a corporation wholly owned by nonresidents paid
a fifty percent corporate tax. The separate entity countries argue that
this clearly would be discriminatory and that denying the imputation
credit to nonresidents is similarly discriminatory.
Table 2 below provides a basis for evaluating these views. It is
assumed that the United States has a separate entity system of taxation
and that the foreign country has partially integrated its taxes via the
imputation method.
Column 1 shows that a United States resident individual receiving a
$100 dividend from a United States corporation and subject to an in-
dividual tax rate of one-third would have an after-tax cash flow of
$66.67. The United States, of course, would collect the entire $133.33
in tax on the $200 in income earned at the corporate level. Accord-
ing to column 2, a foreign resident individual investing in a foreign
corporation would receive after-tax income of $80. Although the cor-
porate tax rate is assumed to be higher in the foreign country, the
individual shareholder receives a higher after-tax payment because of
integration.
Senate, but with a reservation on another issue, is a notable exception. That treaty
would extend one-half of the United Kingdom imputation credit to United States
direct investors in United Kingdom corporations. See 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH)
8107-5-8107-27(d).
28 This is the credit for foreign taxes paid on the corporate earnings out of which
the distributions are paid. See I.R.C. § 902.
1979]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
0q 00 0
0 00 00
C4
00cq00 00,
to) 0 0
0Z
000 6D
00
cl
0cn
0J
co
im
°'u,
" v
0
0~
0
00 +
x- 0
-
cd
m0 +'
cn F-. 2 z 0
[Vol. 11:535
( 0 1 In CDl 0 0 .04 Q'
64
00000 0
C4 0D00Q 0
64
0
0
0
'-,
0
0
0
0
0
.
0
u 0
> 0
0 0 m
0 *u z :
4 6~ %6 t) o6
TAX INTEGRATION
+ -
cq n
on.~
00 00" 000
V00
0n
C CD00
0
0 ft
00
'o,
00 - m
r_ 06 6.a >
C40 4
00C- 00
0000 00
0000 00000
0l*000 0000
oil 00
oi9 C14
.0 F
:D V4
Z,0
00
00
0
o
00
o 000
o I 000
C-
00
0
00
1979]
06U
v.-
0 0-
Vj
<co
H~ *S'o
'o Uo
v V
u ~
C)C
Z-
4-o u v u l
"- 4-
la0 C4
>,U a.
o~
4 4
o v
*0 U 0
o o M -
CIS.
> 0 CU
000
~C's -
F-H 0 0-
0 u E 5 =t
U
U,
4-
0
C-
0
U
U,
t)
~
CU~
- 4-a
- 04-4
0
CUC-
~ CU
4.~ -~
- .-
- U,
*- 0.)
55
CU
U,
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Columns 3 through 5 illustrate the position of a nonresident
shareholder in a foreign corporation under differing treatment of the
imputation credit. Since the foreign direct investor is assumed to be a
corporation, a United States corporation is interposed between the
foreign corporation and the United States resident individual
shareholder.
If the imputation country does not extend the credit, the United
States corporate shareholder receives a dividend of $80. Since the cor-
poration's United States tax liability is offset by its foreign tax credit,2 9
the individual shareholder receives a dividend of $80 on which he pays
a tax of $26.67, leaving an after-tax income of $53.33. This may ap-
pear inconsistent with capital export neutrality since the United States
resident individual investing in a United States corporation receives
$66.67. The $13.34 difference, however, is attributable to the fact that
the foreign corporate taxes in excess of the United States corporate tax
rate are not creditable for United States tax purposes. Nevertheless, if
the credit were extended to nonresidents, this would facilitate capital
export neutrality by effectively lowering the foreign corporate tax rate.
Although the resident and nonresident individuals receive the same
cash dividend, $80, the $53.33 received by the nonresident individual
appears to be discriminary. The difference is that one country has in-
tegrated its tax system and the other country has not. Those arguing
discriminatory tax treatment contend that this misses the point. The
resident shareholder, they say, receives an imputation credit of $40 in
19 The United States tax liability is more than offset. The indirect or deemed
paid foreign tax credit is'equal to:
dividend received
net earnings x foreign tax paid or
80
80 x 120 = 120
Assuming a United States corporate tax rate of fifty percent, the tentative United
States tax liability on the $200 in grossed-up foreign earnings is $100. The foreign tax
credit is limited, however, to:
foreign taxable income x tentative United States
worldwide taxable income tax on worldwide income or
200
200 x 100 = $100.
The purpose of this limit is to prevent foreign taxes from reducing the United States
tax otherwise due on domestic source income. The $20 excess credit is available,
however, to offset United States taxes on foreign income that has been subject to
relatively low taxation in a foreign country.
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addition to an $80 cash dividend, while the nonresident receives only
an $80 cash dividend. A direct investor, because of its substantial
ownership interest, is assumed to be able to control the dividend-pay-
ing corporation. The nonresident direct investor could therefore in-
crease its after-tax income by increasing the level of cash dividends
paid by the foreign corporation. Still, for a given level of corporate
earnings, a corporation controlled by nonresidents will pay higher
taxes than a corporation owned by residents.
Finally, there is the issue of revenue division. Through the foreign
tax credit, the United States cedes the first slice of tax revenue to the
source jurisdiction. This slice becomes the entire pie when foreign rates
equal or exceed United States rates. The United States is left with only
its tax collected from individual shareholders. Denying the credit to
nonresidents preserves this arrangement, but it does so arguably by
taxing nonresidents more heavily than residents. In effect, nonresidents
are asked to finance part of the revenue cost of integration by bearing
a heavier corporate tax in the imputation country.
Columns 4 and 5 illustrate cases where the imputation country ex-
tends fifty percent and sixty percent, respectively, of the credit to
nonresident direct investors. A rationale for this limited extension, in
addition to source country revenue considerations, might be that
roughly one-half of corporate earnings are distributed to individual
shareholders. Since the theory of integration is to provide relief for
only those earnings that pass out of corporate solution, one can argue
it is appropriate to extend about one-half the credit to nonresident
direct investors.
If one-half the credit is extended, the United States corporation
receives an $80 cash dividend from the foreign corporation and a $20
imputation credit from the foreign treasury. The credit is equivalent to
a reduction in foreign corporate tax. Accordingly, the United States
corporation's tentative United States tax liability of $100 is exactly off-
set by the foreign tax credit, and it distributes $100 to its individual
shareholders. A shareholder taxed at an individual rate of one-third
would have $66.67 in after-tax income.
Capital export neutrality is achieved because all foreign taxes are
now creditable. There is still room for debate as to whether the
nonresident shareholder is taxed more heavily than the resident
shareholder in the imputation country. The arguments are the same as
recited above and need not be reiterated except to note that since the
position of the shareholder has improved, any discrimination has been
1979]
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reduced. Because of the effective reduction in foreign taxes, the
revenue division is slightly more favorable to the United States. Still,
the United States collects no corporate tax on foreign earnings.
The case in which the nonresident's share of the credit is increased
to sixty percent of the resident credit deserves special mention. The ef-
fective foreign corporate rate, allowing for the imputation credit, now
falls below the United States. corporate rate. The dividend to the in-
dividual shareholder, however, cannot be more than $100 because the
United States will always collect the residual corporate tax. 0 The im-
putation countries tend to focus on this point. They note that the com-
bined impact in the residence country of residual corporate taxation
and no relief at the shareholder level means that a nonresident can
never be made "whole" with a resident.
Separate entity countries respond that how they tax their residents
is not the proper concern of the source country. Nondiscrimination
means equal tax treatment of residents and nonresidents in the source
country. Accordingly, nonresidents should receive the same imputation
credit as residents. The fact that it may end up in the coffers of the
other country's treasury, rather than in the shareholder's pocket, is a
choice more properly left to the residence country.
The sixty percent credit also allows all foreign taxes to be credited
and thus comports with capital export neutrality. The full benefit of
the larger credit, however, goes to the United States Treasury. The
shareholder receives the same after-tax income. Under these condi-
tions, it is understandable why imputation countries are reluctant to
extend the credit to nonresidents. While a capital-importing country
may be willing to extend the credit to nonresidents in anticipation of
attracting more investment, that anticipation will be frustrated if the
benefits of extending the credit go to the foreign treasury, rather than
the foreign shareholder.
C. Integration of Foreign Corporate and Domestic Individual Taxes
In addition to deciding whether nonresidents will receive the
shareholder credit, imputation countries must decide whether foreign
corporate taxes will be integrated with the domestic individual income
tax in the shareholder's country of residence. Will a resident portfolio
shareholder in a foreign corporation, for example, be entitled to a
credit for foreign corporate taxes in the same way as the individual in-
vesting in a domestic corporation receives a credit for domestic cor-
30 This is the difference, if any, between the United States and foreign rates.
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porate taxes? Or, will an individual receive a credit for domestic taxes
not paid by a domestic corporation because of the foreign tax credit?
Largely because of revenue considerations, the imputation countries
have tended to respond negatively to these questions. Taxes not paid
at the corporate level, either because of an exemption for foreign in-
come or because of a foreign tax credit, have not been creditable at
the shareholder level.
The following example illustrates the problem with respect to a
corporation earning $200 of foreign source income that is not taxed in
the residence country because of a foreign tax credit.3" Individual
shareholders receive a gross up and credit equal to one-half the cash
dividend.
Example 3
Corporation Individual Shareholder
Income (foreign source) $200 Cash dividend $100.00
Tentative domestic tax $100 Gross up 50.00
Foreign tax credit 100 Taxable income 150.00
Net domestic tax 0 Individual tax
After-tax income 100 (25% rate) 37.50
Cash dividend 100 Tax credit 50.00
Tax refund (12.50)
Total cash
($100 + 12.50) = $112.50
Due to the foreign tax credit, the residence country collects no tax
at the corporate level. If the shareholder credit does not depend on
which jurisdiction has collected the corporate taxes, the residence
country refunds foreign taxes, which it has not collected, to its resident
shareholders. Integrating a foreign corporate tax with the domestic in-
dividual tax therefore can have drastic revenue consequences for the
residence country.
Most imputation countries 2 avoid these consequences by levying a
"pick-up" or compensatory tax on distributions of foreign earnings.
The function of France's precompte, the United Kingdom's ACT, or
Germany's increased corporate tax is the same: to assure that taxes
SI This is not a crucial assumption. The same problem arises in an imputation
country that exempts foreign source income.
31 Canada is a notable exception. The shareholder credit is available for cor-
porate taxes paid to either the Canadian or foreign treasuries. Unlike the French, Ger-
man, and United Kingdom systems, however, the Canadian credit is not refundable.
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creditable at the shareholder level have been collected at the corporate
level. The compensatory tax is typically levied at a rate equal to the
shareholder credit. If the above example followed this approach, it
would be designed to collect $50.00 in tax revenue.
Critics of the pick-up tax mechanism argue that it violates capital
export neutrality by taxing foreign investment more heavily than
domestic investment. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have
dealt with this by developing favorable dividend ordering or "stacking"
rules. In each country, distributions are deemed to be made first from
fully-taxed earnings. Thus, a corporation with sufficient domestic in-
come to finance its desired level of distributions will be able to escape
the compensatory tax.
D. "Clearing House" Mechanism between Imputation Countries
An imputation country may be reluctant to follow the principles of
capital export neutrality and nondiscrimination because of adverse
revenue consequences. For example, a country which integrates the
full corporate tax on distributed earnings, by extending the share-
holder credit to nonresidents and passing foreign corporate taxes
through to its resident individual shareholders would collect zero or
negative 3 tax revenue on the distributed earnings from foreign invest-
ment. One answer to this dilemma is a "clearing house" mechanism as
suggested by the European Economic Community (EEC) Directive on
integration .'
The basic principles of the EEC Directive for the distribution of
earnings from a subsidiary incorporated in one country to a parent
organized in another are as follows:
(1) Dividends from the subsidiary to the parent carry no im-
putation credit to the parent.
(2) Distributions of foreign earnings from the parent to its in-
dividual shareholders carry a credit equal to the imputation credit
in the source (subsidiary's) country.
(3) The parent's country levies a compensatory tax if its
shareholder credit exceeds that of the subsidiary's country.
(4) The source country bears the cost of its credit.
This would be negative revenue in that the government would be obligated to
make refunds to shareholders of tax which it had not collected at the corporate level.
14 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the
Council Concerning the Harmonization of Systems of Company Taxation and of
Withholding Taxes on Dividends, (July 1975) (unpublished paper, copy on file with
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.).
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Table 3 below illustrates the operation of a "clearing house"
mechanism. The subsidiary operates in a country which has a sixty
percent corporate tax rate and an imputation credit equal to forty per-
cent of the cash dividend. The subsidiary earns $200 and distributes
$80 to its parent, which pays no corporate tax because of a foreign tax
credit.
Table 31"
Cash Flow and Tax Revenue Effects of Clearing House Payment
between Two Countries with Shareholder Imputation Systems2"
1. Subsidiary Corporation (Source Country)
2. Taxable Income $200.00
3. Corporate Tax3 ' 120.00
4. Net Income (2-3) 80.00
5. Cash Dividend 80.00
6. Dividend Received by
7. Parent Corporation (Residence Country)
8. Cash Dividend $ 80.00
9. Gross up "  120.00
10. Taxable Income (8 + 9) 200.00
11. Tentative Tax Liability3' 100.00
12. Foreign Tax Credit5"  100.00
13. Net Corporate Tax (11-12) 0
14. Tentative Dividend (14 = 8) 80.00
15. Basis for Compensatory Tax6' 112.00
16. Tentative Compensatory Tax7' 37.33
17. Offsetting Imputation Credit 32.00
18. Net Compensatory Tax (16-17) 5.33
19. Actual Dividend (8-18) 74.67
20. Individual Shareholder
21. Cash Dividend $ 74.67
22. Gross up 2' 37.33
23. Taxable Income (21 + 22) 112.00
24. Tentative Tax Liability8 ' 37.33
25. Shareholder Imputation Credit (25 22) 37.33
26. Net Tax Liability (24-25) 0
27. After-Tax Cash Flow (21-26) 74.67
28. "Clearing House Payment"s* 32.00
29. Total Tax Revenue 125.33
29(a). United States (18 + 28) 37.33
29(b). Foreign (3-28) 88.00
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' This table is from materials of the Office of the Secretary of the
Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, June 7, 1978.
2 The imputation system in the subsidiary's country provides a gross
up and credit equal to forty percent of the cash dividend and in
the parent's country a gross up and credit equal to fifty percent
of the cash dividend.
s. This assumes a corporate tax rate of sixty percent in the
subsidiary's country and fifty percent in the parent's country.
4' For purposes of claiming the foreign tax credit, dividends from a
foreign corporation are increased or "grossed up" by the amount
of foreign taxes deemed paid with respect to the dividends
received.
. This is limited to the lesser of the source or residence country rate.
6* The $80 which the parent corporation has available to distribute is
accompanied by a forty percent or $32 credit from the subsidiary's
country. The sum of these amounts, $112, is the basis of the com-
pensatory tax.
. Since the gross up and credit in the parent's country is fifty percent
of the cash dividend, the maximum compensatory tax would be
one-third of the basis or $37.33.
8 This assumes an individual tax rate of one-third in the
shareholder's country of residence.
9* Under "clearing house" agreement, country of subsidiary cor-
poration bears cost of its own imputation credit.
The parent is unable to distribute the full $80 to its individual
shareholders because its country provides a larger shareholder credit
(fifty percent of the dividend) than the subsidiary's country. The
parent pays a compensatory tax on the difference and distributes
$74.67 in cash plus a credit of fifty percent or $37.33 to its
shareholders. A shareholder in the one-third tax bracket would pay no
additional tax and would have an after-tax cash flow equal to the divi-
dend, $74.67. Under the "clearing house" arrangement, the source
country would pay the cost of its credit, $32.00, directly to the
treasury of the parent's country.
Although the EEC Directive on integration has no been adopted
by any of the EEC member countries, it is an attractive arrangement
for a number of reasons. The imputation credit is available only on
earnings distributed to individual shareholders. This is consistent with
the theory of integration and responsive to a major concern of the im-
putation countries. Apart from the limit on the foreign tax credit at
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the corporate level s3 the system satisfies capital export neutrality since
foreign and domestic earnings are taxed alike. Nondiscrimination is
also respected since both residents and nonresidents are taxed alike in
the source country and both groups receive the credit.
As regards the division of tax revenues, the source country sur--
renders the integrated portion of its corporate tax. Since the residence
country is assured of the revenue on the integrated portion of its cor-
porate tax, it will not be in the position of crediting (or refunding) tax
it has not collected. If the source and residence countries have cor-
porate tax rates of about one-half and integrate about one-half of that
tax, as suggested by the EEC Directive, they would divide the revenue
on distributed earnings almost equally. This would be a sharp depar-
ture from many of the present systems which cede the first and largest
slice of tax revenue to the source country.
V. CONCLUSION
United States international tax policy is based on the principles of
capital export neutrality, nondiscriminatory taxation of residents and
nonresidents, and a reasonable division of revenue between the source
and residence countries. Pursuit of these principles in the face of the
trend toward integration has required the United States to ask the im-
putation countries to extend the shareholder credit to United States in-
vestors. Presumably, the United States would be prepared to make the
same concession if it decides to follow the trend and integrate its tax
system. The United States may be tempted, however, to follow the ex-
ample of most imputation countries and not integrate foreign cor-
porate taxes with its individual income tax. If so, the principle of
capital export neutrality would be sacrificed for tax revenue. The
answer to this dilemma may be a "clearing-house" mechanism along
the lines of the EEC directive. This would integrate foreign corporate
and domestic individual taxes, thus preserving capital export neutrality,
while dividing the revenue from distributed corporate earnings about
equally between the source and residence countries.
11 This shortcoming exists even under the present credit arrangement in classical
tax countries such as the United States. It is not unique to an integrated system.
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